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Introduction: what’s the speed limit?
In 1973, the then United States President, Jimmy Carter,
addressed the issue of declining petroleum resources and
increasing automobile traffic by the institution of a
rationing plan that mandated decreasing consumption
fairly and equitably across the entire population of con-
sumers. The national speed limit (NSL) decreased from
70 to 55 miles per hour, and, according to experts, consti-
tuted the perfect rationing plan [1]. It affected only those
who used a scarce resource (gasoline) and it applied to all
equally. In a perfect world, it should have been an
extremely effective conservation method.
However, many motorists in the USA were not eager to
participate in this utopian plan designed to rescue the
whole. American motorists traditionally drive at a speed
that is comfortable for them, considering the surround-
ing circumstances regardless of a posted limit. The
Federal Government assigning a speed that did not feel
comfortable to the average motorist virtually guaranteed
eventual noncompliance [2]. This otherwise fair
rationing plan set the stage for a roadway game of
evasion, detection, and escalating technology supporting
both sides [3]. The law was eventually repealed because
it could not be enforced [4].
As a practical matter, motorists who would comply with
the law would not exceed 55 miles per hour regardless of
the NSL. Motorists who, for whatever reason choose to
exceed the speed limits, will always try to stack the deck
in their favor when dealing with speed limit enforcement.
As technology for detecting speeders improved, so did the
technology for detecting detectors [5]. And so a fair and
equitable rationing plan designed to benefit the whole at
the cost of minimal individual conformation failed
because the administrative cost of enforcing individual
compliance effaced the advantage [6].
Medical economics and speed limits
Two and a half decades later we find ourselves in a similar
situation for medical economics, searching for a speed limit
that will restrict excessive and capricious allocation of
scarce healthcare resources. Distributive or social justice
with regard to healthcare is particularly difficult given the
Western mentality that healthcare, from immunizations to
experimental fertility treatment, is a basic human right; a
right sacrosanct from the clutches of rationing, the very
antithesis of democracy as we know it. If, however, we
continue to ignore the increasing speeds in the allocation
highway consumers have come to enjoy, we have the
potential to compromise all levels of healthcare. The para-
digm of a democratic nation might be obliterated with a
bankrupt healthcare system as its decrepit beacon.
Traditionally, Americans are staunchly opposed to
rationing, or any other impingement on intrinsic moral
rights, but unlimited demand for scarce resources quickly
depletes the available supply. Therefore, even though
unpopular, the need for resource allocation management
eschews the explicit need to ration, or at least diffuses the
dastardly word into an acceptable method. While
Americans may not be ready to ration their resources,
some kind of rational management to protect the whole is
justifiable. Toward that end, it is regrettably necessary to
wade into the swamp of semantical contradictions tended
by Health Maintenance Organizations and a veritable
slew of their various predacious counterparts.
But the signpost says: ‘speeding encouraged’
Based on Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI)
analysis of the March 1998 Current Population Survey [7],
private or public health insurance, or both, covered 81.7%
of Americans (193.1 million). Seventy-one per cent of the
nonelderly population had private insurance, 64.2%
through an employment-based plan. All these agencies
are sensitive to sociopolitical pressures. The same political
bodies that find political favor with voters by telling them
healthcare is a basic right cannot go to that same popula-
tion and advise them that their services must now be
NSL = national speed limit; EBRI = Employee Benefit Research Institute; ICU = intensive care unit; COBRA = Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act; DRG = diagnostic related group; HMO = Health Maintenance Organization.limited in order to make them affordable. Accordingly,
healthcare consumers are told to consume as much as they
desire, then rationing occurs at the level of providers.
Reimbursement is denied prospectively on the basis of
administrative, not medical issues. So in the end, consumers
have a maximum incentive to consume, providers must
allocate scarce resources on demand rather than need, and
no prospective planning can take place because of retro-
active denial of payment for services already expended.
Prospective intensive care unit (ICU) patients suffer no
liability for demanding as much critical care service as
they desire. If an ICU patient appears to be unsalvage-
able, the popular media tells them that moribund patients
sometimes awaken after years of coma. If a physician
advises against further aggressive care, the trial lawyer
industry tells them physicians’ opinions cannot be trusted.
Once they land in an ICU bed, the time-honored princi-
ples of triage evaporate into an antipaternalistic haze and
occupants own that bed as long as they desire it. Threats
of lawsuits for physician and hospital noncompliance with
patient wishes are taken seriously following Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA; of 1985)
legislation [8] and current legal precedent [9].
If some consumers are allowed to use resources in such a
manner, adopting the Jimmy Carter model by setting a
NSL for critical care healthcare provision would conserve
scarce resources [10]. Such a limit would require those
desiring to use excessive speeds for selfish purposes to
simply slow down, extending resource availability for
everyone else using the road, and allow those who under-
stand the cost versus benefit of critical care services to
enforce the restriction.
Slow down: speed limits save lives!
Examples of the relationship between resource utilization
conservation and potential benefit abound in the litera-
ture. Hiatt [11] states that ‘as we develop more and more
practices that may be beneficial to the individual, but not
to the interests of society as a whole, we risk reaching a
point where marginal gain to individuals threaten the
welfare of the whole.’ In a Health Technology Case Study
[12] a congressional report stated ‘the best responders are
patients with acute reversible illnesses without significant
underlying disease. The worst responders are patients
with exacerbations of chronic conditions for which there is
no definitive therapy.’ Scheffler [13] found a non-linear,
‘U’ shaped relationship between use of resources and
probability of survival. At one end of the spectrum, an
increasing amount of therapeutic intervention generated a
decreasing mortality rate. At the other end, 40% of
resources were used to temporarily prolong life in 9% of
the patient population, and the mortality increased with
the number of therapeutic interventions. Detsky [14]
found that patients having the highest per capita hospital
expenses fell into two groups: (1) survivors who had been
predicted to have a poor chance of survival on admission;
and (2) nonsurvivors who had been predicted to have a
good chance of survival on admission.
Patients having the lowest per capita charges were found
to be: (1) nonsurvivors who were predicted not to survive
on admission; and (2) survivors who were predicted to
survive on admission.
There does not seem to be any difficulty identifying
which patient population can be predicted to benefit from
the allocation of scarce resources. The problem is how to
effectively divert the allocation of resources away from
patients predicted to do poorly, and toward those pre-
dicted to do well.
Gaming the system: radar detection
But Americans hate speed limits. They drive at any speed
they desire, and go out of their way to avoid detection by
creative and innovative methods. Such maneuvers to set
aside an otherwise fair apportionment plan sets the stage
for hospital to hospital combat characterized by evasion,
detection, and escalating gaming of the system supporting
both sides. ICU admission effectively becomes a first-
come, first-served contest. Families threaten to sue if their
wishes are not explicitly followed. Futility is defined only
as an inability to support vital signs. Unsalvageable
patients can only die undergoing every conceivable
aggressive measure thought of by the patient or their fami-
lies. Physicians and nurses practice ‘slow codes and sur-
reptitious euthanasia’, but there is no germinal law to
repeal. It is an ongoing contest between those with an
incentive to consume and no liability if they do not, and
those with an incentive to conserve but much liability if
they try to implement it.
Continued usage of scarce resources on the basis of desire
rather than on established need will eventually seal the
impending demise of the current system if change is not
forthcoming. Reimbursers have effectively served notice
that they will continue to ration at a level that will not
generate adverse political consequences for them. Politi-
cally correct budgeting schemes such as ‘rationing by
inconvenience’ [15] and retroactive denial of reimburse-
ment after services have been rendered [16] must surely
fail because they simply act to diminish quality of care and
do not directly address the issue of unrestricted demand.
There is only one way to avert disaster and that is by
effectively macro-managing consumer demand [17].
A cop behind every sign board
High quality critical care in the USA controlled by ICU
directors improves the health of its citizens [18,19] and the
results of that care can be quantified [20]. We cannot,
however, maximize cost benefit in critical care within the
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supersedes realistic need. Daniels [21] studied the differ-
ence between allocation of scarce resources in the UK and
in the USA. The British spend less than half our yearly
expenditures on medical care, but provide universal access
to the system for all citizens, and all know in advance what
limitations are in effect. Advanced planning is not only
possible, it is mandatory. Since all patients have equal
access within this ‘closed system’, resources must be allo-
cated with judgment as to which needs are most beneficial
for the entire group. Introduction of beneficial new proce-
dures must be weighed against the benefits of alterna-
tives. Although an added service or procedure might help
one group of patients, its cost might be high enough to
deny other patients services.
In such a system, physicians do not directly or indirectly
benefit from delivering care at lower cost, avoiding poten-
tial conflicts of interest. Since distributing the resources
most equitably within the system provides optimal care
for all, saying ‘yes’ instead of ‘no’ might be unjust. This
approach espoused by the British is representative of a
Rawlsian concept of ‘justice as fairness’ [22]. ‘The higher
expectations of those better situated are just if and only if
they work as part of a scheme which improves the expec-
tations of the least advantaged members of society’.
Conversely, medical care in the USA is an ‘open system.’
We make no prospective medical budget determinations,
or estimates of cost effectiveness. All varieties of medical
care are equally funded in theory, but with a catch 22.
Instead of determining how much should be allotted ser-
vices, the USA prospectively allows all services, then retro-
spectively denies reimbursement for some after they have
been rendered. Care givers are placed in the position of
expending resources, which may not be repleted according
to the whims of gatekeepers and technicalities. There is no
real way to determine whether resources expended will be
replenished until after the fact thus making resource
allocation planning difficult if not impossible.
Furthermore, cost containment measures in the USA reward
institutions and individuals for delivering care at a lower
cost. Hospitals who deliver care for less than the diagnostic
related group (DRG) allowance may pocket the difference.
Individual physicians within the Health Maintenance
Organization (HMO) system profit directly for cutting costs;
thus the patient may be regarded as the proverbial enemy.
Since there are no specific priorities for resource utilization,
saying ‘no’ in the USA does not necessarily result in savings
which benefit other patients within the system. Saying ‘no’
to some procedures carries no assurance that we are concur-
rently saying ‘yes’ to other more beneficial ones. Savings
gained may be reinvested in some other procedure, which
may benefit even fewer patients, or it may be returned to
investors, as in the case of ‘for profit’ hospitals.
As patients put the gas pedal to the metal, two primary
identification and allocation issues result that must be
addressed expeditiously if critical care medicine as we
know it is to survive. Those issues are bed allocation
control and the working definition of futility.
Warning: more than one occupant illegal
Legal precedents involving ICU bed allocation are scarce
but ominous. The Von Stetina case [23] involved a previ-
ously healthy 27-year-old woman injured in a motor
vehicle accident. She was taken to a hospital where emer-
gency surgery was performed, following which she was
admitted to the hospital’s ICU. Initially, she seemed to be
recovering, but had been paralyzed and sedated for hemo-
dynamic reasons. She accidentally became disconnected
from her ventilator and its alarm had been defeated. After
she ultimately became bradycardic from hypoxemia, the
heart rhythm alarm sounded and she was promptly resus-
citated. Unfortunately, the cerebral anoxic insult was suffi-
cient enough to render her in a persistent vegetative state,
with no hope of recovery. During the trial for malpractice,
it was established that at the time of Ms Von Stetina’s
admission to the ICU, there were a total of seven patients
in the ICU, cared for by three Registered Nurses and one
Licensed Practical Nurse. This staffing was considered to
be adequate.
However, five more patients were admitted to the unit
from midnight to 0600h, and the number of nurses
remained the same. There was no ICU director in evi-
dence to direct admissions or deal with bed occupancy
problems. It was alleged that there were too many patients
for the number of nurses present to care for adequately.
Ostensibly, Ms Von Stetina’s technological hardware
failed because her nurse was too busy to observe and
monitor her adequately. The question arose, what were
the available nurses doing that night? One patient in the
ICU at the time of the bed occupancy crisis was close to
passing brain death criteria and, in fact, was declared dead
the next day. Another patient was considered terminal,
and did, in fact, expire the next day also. It was further
established that there were three other hospitals in the
area with vacant beds and a quorum of nurses that could
have taken transfers. It was ultimately established that the
facility, which held itself out to be a critical care unit, did
not, in fact, provide that service due to staff/patient dis-
proportion. The hospital was found liable for a judgment
of US$12 470 000.
The Von Stetina case illustrates a moral issue that has not
been effectively dealt with to date. Does occupancy of a
critical care bed guarantee possession thereof indefinitely
until death or full resolution of admission illness? The
‘temporary lottery’ for ICU beds may make hospitals
liable for damages if ‘good prognosis’ patients are denied
the benefit of critical care resources because nursing care
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The Von Stetina cases suggests a legal obligation to dis-
charge patients with only a borderline possibility of benefit-
ing from an ICU treatment so as to maintain good standards
of care for those patients remaining. If ‘early arrivals’ have
no special rights to an ICU bed just by being early arrivers,
then patients deriving marginal benefit from those beds can
be moved to make room for those having a better prognosis.
What’s the top end on that ventilator?
If decision-makers for moribund patients choose to define
futility in terms of vital sign support, then virtually every
ICU treatment plan is fair game. Futility exists only if
ICU technology cannot sustain a blood pressure or heart
rate. Under such a stringent definition, virtually any life
support system is fair game even if it prolongs inevitable
death. However, if current concepts of futility are rede-
fined in terms of organ system failure, more flexibility is
possible in the determination of inappropriate care plans
[25]. If, instead of using the archaic term ‘futile’, we advo-
cate the option of ‘not medically indicated’ as a viable
reason to limit life support, assessments of viability under
sophisticated life support systems would be rendered
more accurate. Moribund states that render a fallacious
appearance of viability can be identified [26].
Under the auspices of an ‘inappropriate care’ speed limit,
patients in a persistent vegetative state could not be trans-
ferred to the ICU nor could they receive prolonged
mechanical ventilation and indefinite preservation in the
ICU. Intensive care admissions could be curtailed for
patients with end-stage dementia and they would be
treated palliatively when they become acutely ill or
offered hospice. There would be no compelling reasons to
start long-term enteral tube feedings for patients with
end-stage dementia. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation would
not be provided to chronically ill patients who are near
death. The speed limit would be posted at frequent inter-
vals along the traveled route for all to see. Open lines of
communication between the physician and patient as well
as documentation of patient wishes in the form of advance
directives would squash many of the conflicts that present
when end of life treatment decisions are held in question.
Critical care physicians with cop hats?
The current trend of increasing demand, decreasing
supply, and retroactive denial of payment for services pre-
viously rendered will do little other than decrease quality
of care and increase administrative costs of healthcare pro-
vision. Consumers on the medical services highway speed
with impunity because thay have no incentive not to.
Cops assigned to patrol the highway have an incentive to
wink at speeders. The chances of getting caught are so
remote as to foster apathy and even antipathy toward the
need for speeding laws. The effective speed limit is
simply whatever the traffic will bear.
The only way to preserve the availability of needed and
necessary critical care services is to titrate demand-to-need
at its most sensitive level: the bedside. A bedside modu-
lated by a trained and experienced critical physician with a
jurisdictional authority to ‘say no’ to demands for capri-
cious treatment not supported by evidence-based clinical
literature [27,28]. Every time consumers stomp on the gas
pedal, there is an ICU physician there to adjust their
speed to a cost–benefit ratio adjudicated by righteous and
reproducible clinical evidence. If we continue to allow
unrestrained desire out of proportion to clinical reality to
rule, our only option will be utilizing ICU’s for warehous-
ing warm cadavers [29].
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